MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: WERNER E. MICHEL
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT)

SUBJECT: Improper Material in Spanish-Language Intelligence Training Manuals

PURPOSE: ACTION -- To provide the final report on the inquiry into Spanish-language intelligence training manuals containing improper material (attachment).

DISCUSSION: We have completed the investigation requested by ASD(C3I) and found that the manuals, which contained objectionable material, were compiled without the required doctrinal controls. Our report of investigation contains recommendations for corrective action. If you approve, the ASD(C3I) will issue instructions to implement these measures.

COORDINATION: The DoD General Counsel and the ASD(C3I) have concurred in this report. (See next page for recommendations.)

RECOMMENDATION OF ATSD/R

APPROVE ASD/C3I issuing instructions to implement the recommended corrective actions at "REC" Tab.

SECDDEF DECISION

Approved

Disapproved

Other:

SECDDEF HAS SEEN:

MAR 27 1992

[Signature]

I concur. Duane Andrews will follow up with briefings to the intelligence and armed services committees whom we briefed on the problem to let them know how we are correcting it.

[Signature] 3/20

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SECRET

See Def Cont Nr. X58571
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

IMPROPER MATERIAL IN SPANISH-LANGUAGE INTELLIGENCE TRAINING MANUALS (U)

INTRODUCTION (U)

(U) On 9 August 1991, ASD(C3I) requested that our office investigate and report to you on USSOUTHCOM's use of counter-intelligence manuals containing objectionable material in the training of Latin American military students (TAB A). We initiated our inquiry on 16 August 1991 (TAB B) and, on 4 October 1991, submitted an interim response (TAB C). During our investigation, we interviewed personnel and reviewed documents in Washington, DC; at USSOUTHCOM in Panama; at Army offices responsible for the approval of training doctrine, and at the U.S. Army School of the Americas (USASOA) and the Army Intelligence School. (Organizations visited and personnel interviewed are listed at TAB D.)

EVOLUTION OF THE MANUALS (U)

(U) Our inquiry revealed that seven Spanish-language manuals had been compiled from outdated instructional material without the required doctrinal reviews or approval. They had evolved from lesson plans used in an intelligence course at USASOA. They were based, in part, on old material dating back to the 1960's from the Army's Foreign Intelligence Assistance Program, entitled "Project X." This material had been retained in the files of the Army Intelligence School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. (Representative "Project X" material is attached at TAB E.)

(U) We found that neither the Army element at USSOUTHCOM nor the faculty at USASOA followed the Army policy for the doctrinal approval of the manuals. This process requires that all intelligence instructional material be developed or reviewed by "Subject Matter Experts" at the Army Intelligence School. To compound the problem, no English-language versions of the manuals were ever prepared. (At TAB F is the response by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence addressing the Army's policies on approval of intelligence training for foreign students.)

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CASE # 19
(U) In USSOUTHCOM, Mobile Training Teams distributed copies of the seven manuals listed at TAB G to military personnel and intelligence schools in five Latin American countries (Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala and Peru). We found that as many as a thousand copies of these manuals may have been distributed in the USSOUTHCOM area from 1987 to 1989 and at USASOA from 1989 to 1991.

(U) In 1987, Army military intelligence (MI) officers in Panama had compiled the manuals from lesson plans used in an MI course at USASOA since 1982, as noted above. The officers assumed that the information in the lesson plans reflected current and authoritative doctrine and, therefore, sought no additional approval either from USSOUTHCOM or the Army.

USASOA (U)

(U) At USASOA, which had moved in 1984 from Panama to Fort Benning, Georgia, the manuals were introduced into the MI course in 1989. At that time, with a bilingual MI officer now on the staff, the school assumed responsibility for MI instruction. In preparing the course, the instructor obtained copies of four of the manuals from his former organization, the Army's 470th MI Brigade in Panama. Ironically, the material in the manuals essentially reflected information in lesson plans for the MI course at USASOA. As had been the case in USSOUTHCOM, the USASOA instructor also erroneously assumed that the manuals, as well as the lesson plans, represented approved doctrine. Thus, copies of the four manuals were issued as supplemental reading material to military students from 10 Latin American countries attending intelligence courses at USASOA until 1991. (The students came from Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.)

ANALYSIS OF THE MANUALS (U)

(U) An Army review, dated 21 February 1992, conducted at our request (TAB H), concluded that five of the seven manuals contained language and statements in violation of legal, regulatory or policy prohibitions. These manuals are: Handling of Sources, Revolutionary War and Communist Ideology, Terrorism and the Urban Guerrilla, Interrogation and Combat Intelligence. To illustrate, the manual Handling of Sources, in depicting the recruitment and control of HUMINT sources, refers to motivation by fear, payment of bounties for enemy dead, beatings, false
imprisonment, executions and the use of truth serum. The manual also discloses classified HUMINT methodology that could compromise Army clandestine intelligence modus operandi. A sixth manual, Counterintelligence, includes statements that also could be interpreted to be in violation of legal, regulatory, or policy prohibitions, and contains sensitive Army counterintelligence tactics, techniques, and procedures. Only the manual entitled Analysis I does not appear to violate any restrictions; however, the information therein is considered obsolete. (Department of Army review is at TAB I.)

APPROVAL AND REVIEW PROCESS (U)

(U) On 13 February 1992, in response to our request (TAB B), the Director, Joint Staff, provided information on the function of the Joint Staff in the approval of foreign training (TAB J). The document addresses the procedures to be followed by components and service schools, Joint Staff, DIA and the ASD(C3I) in training foreign military personnel in intelligence, CI, security and law enforcement. However, no policy guidance has so far been published by the Joint Staff.

(U) The service schools and components play an important role in the development of training materials and courses. For example, CI training for foreign military students should be developed by the Army Intelligence School and approved through Army channels. In addition, the combatant commander has the inherent responsibility to ensure that such training conducted in his area of responsibility is consistent with U.S. and DoD policy. To illustrate, we were told by USCINCSO that one of his major priorities is the emphasis on adherence to human rights policies by Latin American armed forces. Obviously, the offensive and objectionable material in the manuals contradicts this policy, undermines U.S. credibility, and could result in significant embarrassment.

(U) In theory, the offending and improper material in the manuals should have been discovered during the Army's existing review and approval process. It is incredible that the use of the lesson plans since 1982, and the manuals since 1987, evaded the established system of doctrinal controls. Nevertheless, we could find no evidence that this was a deliberate and orchestrated attempt to violate DoD or Army policies.
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT IMPLICATIONS (U)

(U) Indirectly, the misinterpretation of the intelligence oversight (IO) regulations may also have contributed to the failure of the system. Army intelligence personnel involved in the preparation and presentation of the intelligence courses failed to recognize that the materials in the lesson plans and manuals contravened DoD policies. Our interviews revealed that these individuals mistakenly assumed the DoD and Army IO regulations implementing E.O. 12333 were applicable only to U.S. persons and thus did not apply to the training of foreign personnel. Their IO training focused primarily on ensuring that there was no collection on U.S. persons and ignored the fact that intelligence activities must also be legal and proper.

FOLLOW-ON ACTIONS: RECOVERY OF THE MANUALS (U)

(U) As noted in our interim report, DoD representatives in Latin American countries have been instructed to advise their counterparts that the manuals are outdated and do not represent U.S. government policy. USSOUTHCOM also continues its effort to recover the manuals; however, due to incomplete records, retrieval of all copies is doubtful.

RECOMMENDATIONS (U)

(U) To reduce the possibility of a recurrence of such a situation, we recommend the following corrective actions:

1. (U) The Joint Staff should establish a policy to ensure that:

   - Intelligence and counterintelligence training for foreign military personnel by Combatant Commands is consistent with U.S. and DoD policy; and

   - Instructional material to be used in such training has been approved by the respective service component.

2. (U) DoD intelligence agencies and military service schools conducting intelligence training of foreign personnel should ensure that:

   - Training materials have been approved by the appropriate proponent school or doctrinal authority for consistency with U.S. and DoD policy;
Information and documents have been cleared for release to foreign governments; and

A master copy of the lesson plans and instructional material is available in the English language.

3. (U) The Army conduct a damage assessment of the classified information disclosed through the use of these manuals in training Latin American students.

4. (U) For record purposes, the DoD General Counsel should retain one copy of each of the seven manuals along with a copy of this report. All other copies of the manuals and associated instructional materials, including computer disks, lesson plans and "Project X" documents, should be destroyed.

Attachments (10)

A - SECDEF MSG DTG P 091924Z AUG 91 (S)
B - SECDEF MSG DTG P 161230Z AUG 91 (U)
C - ATSD(IO) Memo, "Interim Report on Improper Material in USSOUTHCOM Training Manuals," dtd 4 Oct 91 (S)
D - List of Persons Interviewed (U)
E - U.S. Army Intelligence School, Foreign Intelligence Assistance Program ("Project X") Training Material (C)
F - ACSI Memo, "Counterintelligence Instructional Manual Inquiry," dtd 31 Jan 92 (U)
G - Listing of Manuals (U)
H - ATSD(IO) Memo, "Intelligence and Counterintelligence Manuals," dtd 13 Sep 91 (U)
I - DAGC Memo, "Intelligence and Counterintelligence Manuals," dtd 21 Feb 92 (S)
J - Dir, Joint Staff Memo, "Counterintelligence Instructional Manual Inquiry," dtd 13 Feb 92 (S)